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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUAN S. CASTRO, 
vs. 
I 
A;>pellanl, ) 
I 
\Case No. 
DEPART.lVIENT OF E.;\IPLOY- / 11355 
MENT SECURITY AND IlOA~~D I 
OF REVIE'V OF TI!R INDCS- ) 
TRIAL C01H1UISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. ; 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATE_MENT OF CASE 
Petition for review challenging the Department 
of Employment Security as affirmed by the Appeals 
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah holding appellant, Juan S. Castro, 
lo be disqualified from receiving unemployment com-
pensation benefits under Section 35-4-5 ( d) UCA, 1953, 
1 
by reason of the fact that he was unemployed due to .
1 
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike i~ 
which he was involved. 
llELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the Board 
of Review and an order granting Appellant unemploy-
men compensation benefits. 
S'l'ATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant was employed by the Kennecott 
Copper Corporation in 1946 (TR-0019) and was still 
employed there on July 14, 1967 at the time of a stoppage 
of work which was caused by strike of Appellant's 
union, which strike was supported by picket lines (TR-
0020). The Appellant, a member of striking union No. 
485, United Steelworkel'ls of America (TR-0020) 
served on the picket line on several occasions during the 
strike and returned to work at Kennecott at the end 
of the strike ( TR-0024) . At all times during the strike 
he maintained his seniority, his union membership and 
other company connected benefits ( TR-0022). ·while 
working for Kennecott, the Appellant, for approxi-
mately ten years, had seasonal part-time employment 
with the Salt Lake Turkey Processing Company (TR-
0022) and in 1967 he worked for that company from 
J ulv to December ( TR-0022) , ( TR-0024) . Appellant 
2 
riled a claim for unemployment compensation benefits 
effective December 17, 1967 ( TR-0045) when he was 
lairl off by the processing company due to "Reduction 
of Force" ( TR-0045) . He was denied unemployment 
compensation benefits on the grounds that his unem-
ployment at the time he filed was due to a stoppage of 
work which existed because of a strike against the em-
ployer by whom he was employed at the time he filed 
his c I aim ( TR-0042) . 
S'l'ATEl\fENT OF POINTS 
1. THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
2. APPELLANT \iV AS AN E111PLOYEE 
OF KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE 
STRIKE. 
3. HE WAS UNEMPLOYED DUE TO THE 
STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED 
BECAUSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE 
WAS INVOLVED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT VVITH 
3 
THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE EM-
PLOYl\JENT SECURITY ACT. 
The Utah Employment Security Act was adopted 
in recognition that: 
"35-4-2 .... Economic insecurity due to un-
employment is a serious menace to the health, 
morals, and welfare of the people of this state. 
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general 
interest and concern which requires appropriate 
action by the Legislature to prevent its spread 
and to lighten its burden which now so often 
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed 
worker and his family. The achievement of social 
security requires protection against this greatest 
hazard of our economic life. This objective can 
be furthered by operating free public employ-
ment offices in affiliation with a nationwide sys-
tem of employment services, by devising app~o­
pria te methods for reducing the volume of un-
employment and by the systematic accumulation 
of funds during periods of employment from 
which benefits may be paid for periods of un-
employment, thus maintaining purchasing power 
and limiting the serious social consequences of 
unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, de-
clares that in its considered judgment the public 
good, and the general welfare of the citizens of 
this state require the enactment of this measure, 
under the police power of the state, for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of free public emplor-
ment offices and for the compulsory setting asirlt 
of unemployment reserves to be used for the bem-
fit of unemployed persons." 
4 
The Legislature recognized that certain unemploy-
111c11ts arise by reason of voluntary acts of individuals 
aud that, therefore, disqualifications should be assessed. 
Section 35-4-5 was enacted to establish conditions of 
meligibility in cases of voluntarily leaving work, dis-
charge for misconduct, failure to apply for or accept 
suitable work, and for individuals who became unem-
~loyed <lue to stoppages of work which existed because 
of strikes. Section 35-4-5 ( d) provides: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
" ( d) For any week in which it is found by the 
commission that his unemployment is due to a 
stoppage of work which exists because of a strike 
involving his grade, class, or group of workers 
at the factory or establishment at which he is or 
was last employed." (Emphasis added.) 
This Court in the case of Gus P. Lexes, et al vs. 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, De-
' partment of Employment Security, and American 
Smelting and Refining Company, 121 Ut. 551, 243 P. 
2d 964, said: 
"The 'Utah Unemployment Reserve Law' as it 
was first known was enacted in 1953, Chapter 38, 
Laws of Utah 193.5. Section 1 declared that the 
policy of the act was to lessen the burden of in-
5 
voluntary employment 'which now so often fa]], 
with cru~hing force upon the unemployed worker 
and his family.' The act was designed to establish 
'financial reserves for the benefit of persons 1;11 _ 
employed through no fault of their own.' At that 
time this nation was in the throes of a great eco-
nomic depression. The purpose of providing un-
employment benefits was twofold: first, to allevi-
ate the need of the worker and his family who 
found no market for their services and w~re de. 
prived of wages by the general business collapse; 
second, it was a 'pump-priming' measure to pro-
vide increased buying power and thereby stimu-
late our economic system. In present times of 
prosperity, neither of these objectives would be : 
served by granting benefits to the present claim-
ants. Future times may present occasions when 
the cushioning effect of unemployment compen-
sation may arrest the course of a narrowing down-
ward economic spiral so as to make pump-priming 
in its raw form unnecessary. Labor's right to seek 
higher wages by concerted lawful economic pres-
sure is recognized but the labor force which 
chooses to strike in order to enforce its demands 
cannot be classified as involuntarily unemployed. 
It is specifically disqualified from receiving com-
pensation by statute. Those who are in sympathy ! 
with the striking body and stay away from their . 
available jobs in order to uphold the reciproc~I ' 
pact amongst laboring forces to honor each others 
picket lines cannot logically be placed in any 
other category. 'Ve believe that consideration of 
the background and general purpose of unem· 
ployment legislation is wh~t has prompted the 
courts to hold that the decision of an employee 
not to cross a picket line which surrounds his 
place of work cannot be deemed an involuntary 
act." 
6 
lt appears dear that it is the policy of the Act to 
deuy benerits to an individual who remains attached to 
an employer where there is a stoppage of work due to a 
strike iu which the individual is directly involved. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT 'VAS AN EMPLOYEE OF 
~d~NNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION DUR-
ING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE 
STRIKE. 
Section 35-4-5 ( d) , supra, denies benefits to the 
individual with respect to any week during which he is 
still employed by a struck employer where he is involved 
in the strike. 
The first question that arises is whether or not one 
who is on strike is no longer to be considered an employee 
of the struck employer. The authorities appear to be 
quite unanimous that the relation of employee and em-
ployer is not terminated by reason of the strike. 
In Benny Cruz vs. Department of Employment 
Security, 453 P. 2d 894, April 29, 1969 (involving a 
benefit claimant under a practically identical fact situ-
ation as is applicable to this Appellant), this court said: 
"On April 20, 1967, less than three months 
before the strike, he went with the sand company 
7 
on an eight-hour basis, in addition to his work 
with Kennecott. He continued on with the sand 
company after the strike until December 20 
196'7, when he was laid off because of inclement 
weather. I-Ie did not quit his jC1b with Kennecott 
and he returned to work there after about thre~ 
months' unemployment after leaving the sa1td 
company. From the inception of the strike until 
final settlement (eight months) he retained his 
seniority rights and other benefits incident to his 
employment with Kennecott, he himself paying 
premiums on his group insurance policy, etc. H(' 
had no such rights or obligations, and no such 
fringe benefits with the sand company. He co11-
ceded he would return to Kennecott when and if 
the strike were settled, which he did. Under the 
facts of this case there seems to be no question 
as to an uninterrupted employee-employer rela-
tionship during the strike, although there was a 
k 
,, 
wor stoppage . . . 
ln Jeffery-De 'Vitt Insulator Co. vs. National La· 
bor Relations Bd., 91 F. 2d 134 ( 4 Cir., 1937), 112 
A.L.R. 948, the court stated: 
"It has long been recognized by the law, as 
well as in common understanding, that the rela· 
tionship existing between employer and employee 
is not necessarily terminated by a strike. As was 
well said by Judge Baker, speaking for the Cir-
cuit Court ·of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, in 
Michaelson vs. United States, 291 F. 940, 942: 
'In the case of a controversy over wages and con-
ditions of work in a private and local industry \IC 
agree with counsel for plaintiffs in error tha~ a 
"strike" docs not of itself terminate the relat1011 
8 
of employer a11d employee. A controversy arises, 
and the employees, then at work, say to their em-
ployer: "V\I e silall stop work until you are in what 
we may consider a more reasonable state of min<l. 
\Ve shall deprfre you of our labor as a legitimate 
means of exerting economic pressure to induce 
you to yield. If we go out, we shall remain at 
hand, ready to negotiate with you concerning 
fair wages and working rules, and ready to re-
turn to work the moment we can agree." If, by 
reason of a failure to agree, the employees stop 
their work, a "strike" is on. They are no longer 
working and receiving wages; but, in the absence 
of any action other than above indicated looking 
to a termination of the relationship, they are en-
titled to rank as "employees," with the adjective 
"striking'' defining their immediate status.' 
* * * 
"In Slate vs. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 P. 
520, 524, in sustaining a conviction under the 
Kansas l ndustrial Court Act, the Supreme Court 
of that state said: 'It may be noted that a strike 
is not a quitting of employment. The man who 
goes out on a strike does not profess to quit his 
employment. He still lays claim to his position 
and asserts a right to go back and take it at more 
d '" a vantageous terms. 
See also Iron :Moulder's Union vs. Allis-Chalmers Co. 
(C.C.A. 7th) 166 F. 45, 52, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315; 
Tri-City Central Trades Council vs. American Steel 
Foundries (C.C.A. 7th) 238 F. 728, 733; Dail-Over-
land Co. vs. 'Villys-Overland, Inc. (D.C.) 263 F. 171, 
188. 
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In Burger vs. Unemployment Compensation Board 
of Rev., 168 Pa. Super 89, 77 A. 2d 737, the Court said: 
"'Vhere there is a labor dispute, whether it 
takes the form of a strike or a lock-out, the rela-
tion of employer and employee is not severed, but 
continues until the dispute is settled or until the 
employee secures other employment." 
POINT III 
HE WAS UNEMPLOYED DUE TO THE 
STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED 
BECAUSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE 
WAS INVOLVED. 
Since the strike does not terminate the relation of 
employer-employee, we go to the next question, does the 
continuance or the taking of other employment after 
the beginning of the stoppage of work which exists be-
cause of the strike dissolve the employer-employee re-
lationship? 
This Court, in Benny Cruz vs. Department of Em-
ployment Security, supra, passed on the specific ques-
tion of the effect of supplemental or intervening em· 
ployment on the matter of the claimant's eligibility for 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
"The question arises as to whether an employee 
1 
out on strike against his employer and who takes 
10 
a job after the strike with another employer, is 
qualified for benefits if the latter employer lets 
him go for some reason with which the employee 
had nothing to do. Generally, paraphrasing the 
statement in Calvin B. Scott v. U. C C. in show-
ing qualification for benefits the applicant must 
1) show he is not disqualified, 2) that the fact 
of employment after the strike alone does not 
sustain such burden, 3) the new employment 
must be intended to be permanent, with an inten-
tion not to return to his former employment, 4) 
must be in good faith and of a type the employee 
performed theretofore, 5) ~ccomplished and 
undertaken by complete severance from his for-
mer employment. 
"Applying the guidelines above, we can come 
to no other conclusion except had Cruz gone 
with the sand company after the strike, such em-
ployment would not have made him eligible after 
being let out by the sand company, under the 
facts of this case, the guidelines mentioned and 
the authorities cited. The circumstance of double 
employment at the time of the strike under the 
facts and concessions here, should not .serve to 
transmute disqualification into qualification. It 
takes little imagination to conclude that were 
we to decide otherwise, dozens or more em-
ployees, anticipating a strike, by the simple de-
vice of obtaining a second job a week or so before 
the strike, with a subsequent reduction in force 
by the second employer, could become eligible 
for benefits. We do not believe such a conclusion 
would be compatible with the letter and spirit 
of the s'tatute." 
In Hopkins vs. California Employment Com., 24 
11 
Cal. 2d 7 44, 151 P. 2d 299, 154 A.L.R. 1081 Aunot. 
decided in 1944, the court stated: 
"Section 56 (a) of the California U uemplor-
ment Insurance Act, under which claimants wei·e 
originally disqualified, provides that 'an indi-
vidual is uot eligible for benefits for uuem_plov-
ment, and no such benefit shall be payable to 
him * %- * (a) If he left his work because of <1 
trade dispute and for the period during which ht 
continues out of work by reason of the fact that 
the trade dispute is still in active progress in the 
establishment in which he was employed. Stats. 
1939, ch 7, Sec. 4, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 
Supp. Act 8780d, Sec. 56 (a). A claimant is thus 
ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the 
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a 
claimant who leaves his work becausee of a trade 
dispute subsequently obtains a permanent full-
time job, however, he is no longer out of work 
and the continuity of his unemployment is brok-
en. If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated 
to the dispute, he is unemployed by reason, uot 
of the trade dispute, but of the loss of the new 
employment. . . . 
"The termination of a claimant's disqualifica-
tion by subsequent employment thus depends o~ 
whether it breaks the continuity of the claimants 
unemployment and the causal connection betwce11 i 
his unemployment and the trade dispute. Su.ch 
employment must be bona fide and not a dey1ce 
to circumvent the statute. lCiting cases.] 
"It must sever completely the relation between 
the striking employee and his former employer. 
The strike itself simply suspends the employe.r-
employee relationship but does not terminate it. 
[Citing cases.] 1"1ere temporary or casual work 
12 
does not sever this relationship for it does not 
effectively replace the former employment. The 
worker expects its terminatoin and does not look 
forward to that continuity of work and income 
that characterizes permanent employment. lCit-
ing cases.J Similarly, part-time employment of 
a claimant does not break the casual relation be-
tween the trade dispute and his unemployment. 
[Citing cases.J Only permanent full-time em-
ployment can terminate the disqualification. If 
bona fide, it completely replaces the claimant's 
former employment, terminating whatever re-
lation existed between the claimant and his 
former employer. It must be judged prospective-
ly rather than retrospectively, with regard to the 
character of the employment, how it was obtained, 
and whether it was in the regular course of the 
employer's business and the customary occupa-
tion of the claimant. [Citing cases.] In the ab-
sence of special circumstances, employment of a 
short duration admits of an inference that it was 
not entered into in good faith with the intent 
that it be permanent. 
* * * 
"In the remaining cases the commission could 
not reasonably conclude that the claimants had 
obtained permanent full-time employment and 
had completely severed their relations with their 
former employers. The undisputed evidence 
shows that the work secured by the claimants 
during the hotel strike was stop-gap employment 
and that the claimants had not forfeited their em-
ployment in the struck establishments." 
In 1960 the matter was before the Pennsylvania 
court in Oluschak vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd. 
13 
of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 255, 159 A. 2d 750, awl iie 
quote from their opinion: 
" ... The record ill<lieates that the claimant 
while 011 ~trike at \V estinghouse, sought and ob'. 
tained employment at 11. \\T. Butterworth & 
Sons, Philmont Road, llethayers, Pa. The em-
ployment began on October 20, 1955, and ended 
by lay-off on .March 9, 1956. He di<l not at a111 
time seYer his employment or resign from the joL 
at \Vestinghouse nor did he give to his employer 
or anyone else any indication of an inteution ~u 
to do. He testified that the new job paid $1.7.J 
per hour plus bonus, on piece work, arnl his job 
at \\T estinghouse paid, prior to the strike, $2.1011 ~ 
cents per hour; that it was similar work; that 'l 
said I y,·ould stay if the job was dependable be-
cause with the bonus, it would be the same as l 
was getting and I said if I made out, I would 
stay there'; and that he joined the union but con-
tinued his membership in the 'V estinghouse 
union. Ile remained on the \V estinghouse pay-
roll as one of the striking employees, with all the 
benefits of fifteen years seniority, insurance and 
other ineidents of that employment. After said 
strike, he was recalled, and with other employees 
of vVestinghouse received the additional benefits 
won by the strike. 
* * * 
"The burden was upon the claimant to pr~Ye 
he was entitled to unemployment compensat~on 
benefits. Smith Unemployment Compensatwn 
Case, 1950, 167 Pa. Super, 242, 74 A. 2d 523. An 
unemployed person because of a labor tlispt~te, 
can only recoyer unemployment compensatwu 
14 
when he can prove that he is not directly inter-
esled, and that he is not a member of the strikin()' 
uuion and that he is not in the same grade or clas~ 
of workers as the strikers. Curcio Unemployment 
Compensation Case, supra; Stahlman Unemploy-
ment Compensation Case, 1958, 187 Pa. Super, 
:.!46, 144 A. 2d 670. In this case the claimant must 
establish, that although at the time of the strike 
he was disqualified under Section 402 ( d), he 
now comes within subsections ( 1), ( 2) and ( 3), 
by showing he obtained a new job and severed his 
employment with VV estinghouse. The evidence 
of an intervening job, standing alone, is not suf-
ficient. Such a job could be stop-gap, part-time 
or temporary employment accepted during the 
strike for economic reasons. The claimant could 
continue to be 'participating in, or directly inter-
ested in, the labor dispute which caused the stop-
page of work' and could still be 'a member of an 
organization which is participating in, or directly 
interested in, the labor dispute which caused the 
stoppage of work' and could be in the same grade 
or class of workers as the strikers. His recall at 
the end of the strike by Westinghouse is evidence 
of his continued membership in the union and of 
the maintenance of his employee status on the 
'¥es ting house payroll, from which it can be in-
f erred that he continued to be 'directly interested' 
in the outcome of the labor dispute." 
'fhe Idaho Supreme Court held in Ankrum vs. Em-
ployment Security Agency (Idaho 1961), 361 P. 2d 
795, that the burden is upon a claimant to establish his 
rligibility for benefits whenever his claim therefor is 
questioned. 
15 
When Appellant was laid off by the Salt Lake 
Turkey Processing Company due to a reduction o! 
force, he continued to be unemployed by reason of the 
strike in which he was involved and through which he 
hoped to receive future higher pay an<l other benefit~. , 
He stood ready to work for Kennecott when the strike 
ended. He recognized that he was an employee of 
Kennecott at all times and that as such he retained hi.1 
seniority and other rights ( TR-0022), ( TR-0026). ln 
the cases discussed herein, the courts were looking tu 
see what effects intervening, supplemental or stop-gap 
employment had on the intentions of the appellants with 
reference to their claims for unemployment compen-
sation benefits. In other words, did they intend to sub-
stitute the new or supplemental employment for th1:: 
struck employment on a permanent basis. 
In Calvin It Scott vs. UCC, and Anaconda Co., 
141 :Mont. 230, 376 P. 2d 733, decided under identical 
statutory provisions, the court examined the leading 
cases in the several states including a number of those 
cited by Respondent and concluded: 
"l. The burden i:i upon claimant to show he is 
not disqualified. 
"2. The bking of other employment by a clain~­
ant while on strike, standing alone, is not suffi-
cient to establish that burden. 
"3. The new employment must not be of the 
stop-gap, part-time or temporary type, but rather 
16 
of the permanent full-time type without inten-
tion of returning to the struck employer at the 
termination of the strike. 
"4. The new employment must have been un-
dertaken in good faith and be of the type former-
ly engaged in by the employee or for which he 
would be skilled and competent. 
"5. There must exist a complete and bona fide 
~everance of his employment with the struck em-
ployer." 
In the Scott case, supra, all of the claimants were 
members of the union that called the strike with the em-
ployer and caused their unemployment; each found some 
form of new employment during the course of the strike 
ancl then, upon losing or quitting same before the end 
of the strike, filed for benefits. All responded to notices 
of recall at the conclusion of the dispute. The decision of 
the court was that: 
"A strike does not sever the employer-employee 
relationship. The burden of showing that this 
relationship is severed by new employment is 
upon the claimant. At best, claimants evidenced 
reluctance to quit or renounce their seniority 
rights with the struck employer and most admit-
ted that they viewed their new work as stop-gap 
employment and that they did return at the end 
of the strike. Therefore, under the substantial-
evidence rule, the lower courts were without 
authority to reverse the benefit denials imposed 
by the Commission." 
In the instant case, the Appellant testified that he 
17 
considered himself to be an employee of Kenneculi 
Copper Corporation all during the period of the strik,, 
and that he retained his several rights as an employer 
of Kennecott. It is clear from the record that his eni-
ployment with Salt Lake Turkey Processing Compmn 
·was secured in order to supplement and not be a suL-
stitute for his employment with Kennecott. There is 
only one reason why the Appellant was unemployed and 
continued to be unemployed after he was laid off by tlit 
Salt Lake Turkey Processing Company and that rea-
son was that the Appellant, his union and other uniurn, 
were involved in a strike at Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration which brought about a stoppage of work. In the 
Scott case, supra, the court said: 
"Having reviewed the records before us of the 
various claimants, it appears that in no case did 
the claimant sustain his burden of proving he 
was not disqualified, and in no case did a claimant , 
show a complete and bona fide severance of his 
employment with the struck employer. 
"Further, no claimant proved that he harl no 
intention of returning for work for the struck 
employer at the termination of the strike." 
The Appellant, in his brief, (page 2) admits thal 
he is not entitled to unemployment compensation fro!11 
his employment at Kennecott but contends that he ii 
entitled to such compensation from his work with Snlt 
Lake Turkey Processing Company. 
The Employment Security Act, Chapter 35-t 
18 
U.C.1\., contains no provisions which would allow a 
beneiit computation which would accomplish such re-
sult. His unemployment was directly due to the strike 
at Kennecott. 
From the record and the testimony, it is clear that 
the Appellant considered his employment with Salt Lake 
Turkey Processing as secondary and supplementary 
and he considered himself to be a regular permanent 
employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation. 
Therefore it is clear that the Department, as af-
firmed by the Board of Review, had no choice in view 
nf the obvious intentions of Appellant but to deny bene-
fits on the grounds that the Appellant was, at the time 
he filed his claims for unemployment compensation 
benefits, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion and that the only reason he was unemployed was 
because there was a stoppage of work due to a strike in 
which he was involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission denying unemployment compensation 
to the Appellant was founded upon substantial evidence 
and its decision should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS: 
Vernon B. Romney 
Attorney General 
Fred F. Dremann, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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